Gobierno en campaña

Me han hecho llegar el informe de la revista líderes sobre el gobierno en campaña.    Es altamente recomendable que lo lean pues si alguien cree que este gobierno tiene éxito porque hace las cosas bien está equivocado. 

Es decir su estrategia de campaña permanente da resultados, sin embargo es puro marketing y nada de sustancia.  Gracias al marketing, que no tiene nada de malo, es que este gobierno ha podido hacer todo lo que le da la gana, sin proveer de resultados tangibles.  Al respecto vale la pena reproducir aquí el assesment que hace la prestigiosa revista economist a través de su Intelligence Unit sobre el futuro de nuestro país.  (ver más abajo).

Abre los ojos ecuatoriano estamos empeñando nuestro futuro al confirmar la carta de de la esclavitud de Rafael Veintimilla.  Si algo se puede admirar de Correa es la voluntad de llevar a cabo su proyecto totalitario y la habilidad política con que lo está logrando, por lo demás nada sustancial de este gobierno.  Si algo debemos aprender la opocision, es no solo a ofrecer y brindar respuestas superiores a los problemas públicos, si no tambien a mercadearlos con más éxito. 

Cierro repitiendo las palabras del campeon Jefferson Perez más vale que nos demos cuenta "no sea que nos quieran confiscar la lengua y cambiar la cabeza".

Economic data
Aug 19th 2008
From the Economist Intelligence Unit
Source: Country Data

 


 

Country Data Ecuador             The content on this page is an     extract from The Economist Intelligence Unit’s CountryData.     CountryData     provides up to 320 economic series for the country.     Data is provided historically     back to 1980 and forecast forward for the next five years. We also provide     25-year forecasts for key indicators to help with long-term planning.     Key data categories include:     demographics and income, GDP, external debt and trade, foreign payments and     fiscal and monetary indicators.     You can purchase an annual     subscription for any country or simply purchase the latest dataset at the     EIU Online Store.     Click     here to buy CountryData at the EIU Online     Store

• After winning the second round of the
       presidential election in November 2006 a radical left-wing former minister
       of finance, Rafael Correa, took office in January 2007. Mr Correa lacks an
       official support base in the unicameral Congress as his Alianza Pais (AP)
       did not field any candidates in the 2006 legislative election. He is,
       therefore, likely to use constitutional reform in 2008 as an opportunity
       to bolster his position, possibly by calling fresh elections in early
       2009. Regardless of the outcome, the Economist Intelligence Unit expects
       the political environment to continue to be characterised by instability,
       with deep-seated politicisation of the country’s institutions impeding
       coherent policymaking.


• Mr Correa has stated that social spending will
       take priority over debt servicing, raising fears of default, but, assuming
       that our macroeconomic forecasts materialise, the government would have
       sufficient resources to devote to social spending without jeopardising
       debt servicing. Nevertheless, growth
       will be lacklustre and an external shock could call into
       question the sovereign’s willingness to remain current on its debt
       obligations. Owing to persistent policy uncertainty, the business environment will remain unattractive. Political
       instability will thwart progress on much-needed reforms to bolster the
       country’s weak infrastructure.


• At 1.8% in 2008 and
       2009, real GDP growth in the outlook period is forecast to be less than
       half the rate of 2003-07, reflecting poor performance by the oil sector
       and low investment growth. Inflation is expected to
       reach double digits in 2008 on the back of higher food prices and
       expansionary fiscal policy. In
       2009 inflation will remain high, but will ease owing to base
       effects and the stabilisation of food prices. High oil prices will provide
       essential support to the external accounts, helping to keep the current
       account in surplus.


• Structural fiscal weaknesses and bottlenecks
       in the productive sector have not been tackled effectively since
       dollarisation in 2000. Competitiveness problems remain a constraint on the
       non-oil economy, where most employment is created. Although it is likely
       that dollarisation will remain in place during the outlook period, an abandonment of the currency regime in
       response to a severe external shock cannot be ruled out, particularly
       given the lukewarm official support for the currency system.
       This would bring with it heavy economic costs and would seriously
       destabilise the business environment.

 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Key indicators	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Real GDP growth (%)	1.9	1.8	1.8	2.2	2.0	1.5
Consumer price inflation (av; %)	2.3	8.9	7.8	4.4	3.4	3.4
Budget balance (% of GDP)	3.6	4.5	2.1	0.5	0.5	0.4
Current-account balance (% of GDP)	2.5	7.2	2.0	1.1	1.0	0.8
Deposit rate (av; %)	5.3	6.8	6.0	6.0	6.2	6.2
Deposit banks' prime lending rate (av; %)	10.1	10.8	11.0	11.3	11.3	11.3
Exchange rate US$:€(av)	1.37	1.56	1.54	1.45	1.37	1.32